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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper argues that anti-poverty policy in South Africa, existing and 
proposed, cannot succeed in a politically acceptable period of time.  With 
one shining exception, policymakers in South Africa, by virtue of their 
fixation with growth on the one hand, and welfare ‘dependency’ on the 
other, impose unnecessary constraints on government’s ability to tackle 
mass poverty, mass unemployment and gross inequality.  The Harvard 
group, appointed to make recommendations for relaxing the binding 
constraints that prevent the country achieving its growth goals, is 
criticised for neglecting the duty to point out the implications of the 
possible failure of their proposals.  AsgiSA’s compilers are criticised for 
the same reason.  Acknowledging the need for sustained and sustainable 
growth for the eradication of poverty, the paper demonstrates that slow 
growth (3-4 per cent per annum) with redistribution, yields welfare 
outcomes (poverty reduction) for the poor that are superior to what 6-7 
per cent per annum distribution neutral growth would yield.  Noting that 
the hypothetical grants used to achieve this end could not be distributed 
because the able-bodied poor for whom they are intended cannot be 
satisfactorily identified, the paper concludes that a universal grant is the 
only way to extend social protection to them.  Numbering some 5-6 
million in workerless households, and possibly another two million in 
‘working poor’ households, they will continue to depend on grants 
intended for children and the aged unless a basic income grant is 
introduced.  The annual increase in the value of final consumption, most 
of which accrues to the top two income deciles, is shown to exceed the 
net cost of a modest basic income grant several times over.  South 
African society is becoming increasingly polarised.  Political will is 
required to persuade the well-to-do that redistribution is necessary to 
avert calamitous social upheaval in the future, consequent upon the 
seemingly growing alienation of the poor. 
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Wenn zwei brave Menschen über Grundsätze 
streiten, haben immer beide recht. 
(Whenever two good people argue over 
principles, both are always right) 
Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach (Harper-
Collins, 1998, p.291) 
 
INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE OF PAPER 
 
Much has been said and written, in recent times, about the virtues (or lack 
thereof) of a basic income grant (BIG). It is a matter on which strong 
views are held, some supported by little more than scraps of anecdotal 
evidence glued together by ancient prejudice. The purpose of this article 
is to reflect not so much on the BIG itself, but rather on the reasons why 
it is unlikely that any other policy can address the problem of the mass 
poverty associated with mass unemployment in South Africa. 
 
We commence with two guides to policy formation: the first is a rule on 
social justice, derived from political theory, the second, a test of 
policymaker’s bona fides (the Display Test). This is followed by a brief 
discussion of the rationale for a BIG, and of government responses to 
proposals for the introduction of such a grant. The report on relaxing 
constraints on growth, made by the Harvard group is then argued to fail 
the Display Test. One of the proposals in its subset of recommendations 
on the labour market, a wage subsidy offered as a means of alleviating 
unemployment, is then subjected to a brief review. A glimpse at the 
recently published Growth Report is used to tackle the growth 
fundamentalist proposition that sustained poverty reduction can only 
come from growth (a claim that fundamentalists use to misrepresent the 
grant proponent’s viewpoints, who contrary to conservative assertions, do 
not deny the importance of growth). This is followed by an excursion into 
the murky recesses where ANC anti-poverty policy is formulated. A 
laudable concern with self-help is argued to translate, without the 
apparent benefit of any evidence, into an anti-welfare stance. An 
empirical demonstration of the welfare superiority of modest growth with 
redistribution over fast, distribution-neutral growth is then presented. The 
next section of the paper examines the consequences of the fact that the 
hypothetical targeted grants used to reduce poverty in the previous 
section of the paper, cannot be implemented in the real world. This drives 
the paper to its logical conclusion, namely, that the only politically 
acceptable way of giving social protection to the mass of able-bodied 
poor people in South Africa, is through a universal social grant (a BIG). 
The paper is concluded with a demonstration of the affordability of a 
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modest BIG in South Africa. This is done by showing that the annual 
increase in final consumption, most of which would have been enjoyed 
by those in the top two deciles, dwarfs the net cost of a BIG. 
 
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND RESPONSIBLE POLICY FORMATION 
 
While recognising that politics is a messy business, where opportunism, 
compromise and expediency often rule, it is as well to remind ourselves 
that the ANC came into power expressing a set of ideals, born out of the 
protracted suffering of the majority of the population. Although policy 
has ostensibly been intended to alleviate the misery of poverty and 
inequality that the democratic government inherited in 1994, many 
among the poor have had to wait an unconscionably long time for relief. 
Impatience in the past has frequently boiled over into social disorder – in 
recent times, it has been coupled with an outburst of xenophobia. While 
poverty and inequality, be they never so extreme, cannot be enrolled to 
excuse the inexcusable, the simmering anger that lies behind the violence, 
has at least part of its origin in continued deprivation, powerlessness, and 
alienation of some large number of people (Everatt et al, 2007) – 
government ignores this at its peril. 
 
It may well be that in the recent upheavals, the most needy played no 
significant part – being either too demoralised or too remote to do so. 
Even so, defending the ethical proposition that the needs of the most 
needy should be addressed first is not difficult. A recent paper by 
Standing (2008) examining the ways that cash grants can boost work and 
economic security, offers five principles or criteria by which to evaluate 
social policy. The first one, and his discussion of it, reads as follows: 
 
‘The Security Difference Principle 
 
A policy or institutional change is socially just only if it improves the 
security and work prospects of the least secure groups in society.’ 
 
‘So, for instance, if a policy boosted the job opportunities of middle-
income groups while worsening the prospects of more disadvantaged 
groups, that could not be justifiable unless the losers were 
compensated in ways they found acceptable. The Security Difference 
Principle stems from Rawls, who from a liberal philosophical 
perspective essentially argued that social and economic inequalities 
are only just if they allow for the betterment of the worst-off groups in 
society ….. 
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Whether or not one accepts the Rawlsian perspective, this principle 
can stand as a moral precept. A policy should be judged by whether it 
helps the least secure. If it does not do so, one should be uneasy 
(especially if it benefits others who are not so insecure), unless some 
other principle is recognised that is demonstrably superior. If so, it 
would be up to the evaluator to state it and support it.’i 
 
Applying this rule to South Africa’s anti-poverty policy yields a mixed 
score card. Correctly identifying the aged and young children as being 
particularly vulnerable, the ANC government left the old age pension 
structure created by the apartheid government intact (by 2003, all 
discriminatory provisions were gone from pensions), and embarked on a 
project of tackling child poverty by a vast expansion of the reach of the 
child support grant. It is, however, misleading to talk of ‘child poverty’ 
(or the poverty of the aged), in abstraction from the households in which 
they are located. Poor children live in poor households – unless the 
poverty of the household as a whole is addressed, child support grants 
will be shared among all in the household. The pensioner story is so well-
known that it hardly needs to be repeated – pensions are large relative to 
mean incomes – a pensioner in a household is thus a highly desirable 
asset. Benefit dilution is inevitable – many a pension supports a large 
household. While the intention of the policymakers may have been 
honourable, it is clear that the outcome is somewhat less so. The security 
of many in the least secure groups has improved, but it could have done 
so by much more if the security of all members of poor households had 
been taken into account. 
 
This brings us to the ‘Display Test’, advanced by Pincione and Tesón 
(2006), which may be used to test policymaker’s bona fides. It is 
described in the long passage that follows, taken word-for-word from 
their article (rephrasing it in other words merely to avoid citing them 
directly, seems silly). They argue that: 
 
‘… someone passes The Display Test if and only if he (sic) publicly 
acknowledges the downsides of his political proposal or, if he did not 
publicly acknowledge them, he would insist on the proposal if exposed 
to those downsides [i.e., that the policymaker concerned would press 
ahead with the proposal even if its drawbacks were made known]. For 
present purposes, we stipulate that a downside of a political proposal is 
any feature of it that, if disclosed, would likely reduce the audience’s 
support for it. Such downsides are not only those outcomes that are 
predictable on the grounds of the most reliable theories available. 
They include, in addition, any non-negligible probability that the 
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proposal will have bad effects, given the most reliable theories 
available. Those who pass The Display Test, then, do not publicly 
conceal or overlook the proposal’s downsides; typically, they do not 
feel embarrassed by their recognition that it may frustrate some worthy 
goals. On the other hand, those who fail The Display Test are either 
ignorant or dishonest. They may be simply people who would 
withdraw their proposals if exposed to their downsides, in which case 
they are ignorant. Alternatively, they may conceal the problems with 
their proposal because they seek rhetorical advantages, as something 
different from winning the audience’s informed approval. In that case, 
they are posturers who take advantage of the audience’s rational 
ignorance.’ii (2006, p.78) 
 
It may be claimed, and with justification, that policy is seldom, if ever, 
made in a manner that would ensure that its sponsors pass the Display 
Test. That this is so, does not in any way detract from the assertion that 
the policymaking process should pass the test. A brief discussion of 
parallels with the law may be useful here. Typical legal enactments 
specify what appropriate social conduct in a particular field should be 
(prescribing if necessary, the institutions required to make this possible), 
then they lay out the sanctions for non-compliance. The pinnacle of the 
body of law, the constitution, however, takes a somewhat different form – 
one that could possibly be described as meta-policy. In a constitution, a 
bill of rights typically specifies the set of freedoms that everyone to 
whom it applies should enjoy. These are usually a mixture of negative 
and positive rights. The former oblige others to refrain from interfering 
with people’s attempts to exercise certain rights and freedoms. Positive 
rights, by contrast, usually involve the transfer of assets or income (in 
cash or kind) to ensure that the rights in question can indeed be exercised.  
 
In the South African case, if, after all of the relevant rights and freedoms 
have been exercised, any individual lacks the wherewithal to sustain 
themselves (admittedly at some minimal level), the state has a duty to do 
so. The relevant sections are 26 (Housing) and 27 (Health care, food, 
water and social security). These and other protections are extended to 
children in section 28. Although sections 26 and 27 each have a ‘weasel 
clause’, that allows the state to evade its responsibilities by proclaiming 
that it lacks the ‘available resources’, the intention of the Constitution is 
clear – if all of the measures intended to permit people to realise their 
potential fail to vouchsafe them a (minimally) acceptable standard of 
living, the state should step in to make good the deficiency. The 
differences between legal enactments and policy measures do not concern 
us here – the issue is that of the principle at stake. The principle 
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established by the Constitution is that when indirect measures (the 
creation of an enabling climate) fail to secure the welfare of certain 
individuals, the state has a responsibility to do so by direct measures 
(housing, health care, food, social security).iii 
 
Translating the general provisions of the Constitution by prescribing 
specific steps which government should take could see the Court 
encroaching on the prerogatives of the Executive and the Legislature, a 
step which the Constitutional Court in the landmark Grootboom case 
explicitly declined to take.iv The Court did, however, offer guidance ‘in 
the form of a “reasonable measures test”’, which has the following 
provisos: 
 
‘A government programme seeking to deliver socio-economic rights may 
be considered a reasonable measure if: 
• the programme is reasonable both in its inception and in its 
implementation; 
• the programme is balanced and flexible; 
• it makes appropriate provision for crises and gives attention to short-, 
medium and long-term needs; 
• the programme does not exclude a significant segment of society; and 
• the programme takes into account the degree and extent of the denial 
of the right it is trying to realise. It does not ignore those whose needs 
are most urgent.’ (Streak and Wehner, 2004, p.64, emphasis in 
original.) 
 
Together, the ‘reasonable measures test’, and the Display Test (with its 
requirement that policymakers look explicitly at possible downsides of 
any policy proposal), make up a formidable apparatus with which to 
evaluate the performance of those in the business of recommending, 
formulating and implementing policy. From the icy clutches of this 
ordeal, there should be no escape for those who, upon being warned, or 
becoming aware of possible ill-effects of the policies they propose, fail to 
acknowledge and make provision for the possible consequences. 
 
WHY A BIG? WHY NOT? 
 
A BIG is a universal transfer to all those with the right to be in a country 
(citizens by birth, by naturalisation, or persons with rights of permanent 
residence). Certain categories of person already receive (or attract) social 
grants, e.g., old age pensioners, children, and the disabled. Although 
some of the institutions representing these latter groups demand that their 
constituents receive the BIG in addition to the categorical grants, the 
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ethical basis for doing so is slender. The old age pension, although not 
generous, is well in excess of median income,v and the argument that it 
costs less to maintain a child than an adult, has some merit. Making 
categorical grants ‘universal’ (dropping means tests that currently limit 
access) would remove the need to give the BIG to those who currently do 
not qualify for the child support grant (CSG), the state old age pension 
(SOAP), or disability (and various other) grants. 
 
In South Africa, the over-riding reason for advocating the BIG is the 
conviction that existing policies for addressing poverty (and inequality) 
cannot succeed in a politically acceptable period of time. Chief among 
these policies is the quest for sustained, rapid economic growth. To say 
that the policy cannot succeed, is not to deny that it is the surest, indeed 
the only way, in the long-term, to eradicate the problem of mass poverty. 
 
‘In the long term’ – aye, there’s the rub. Conservative champions of 
‘growth as the saviour of the poor’ (growth fundamentalists) devote a 
great deal of time to attacking imaginary opponents. Typically, these 
opponents are those who argue that growth, although necessary, is not 
sufficient (something fundamentalists acknowledge), and that the 
complementary measures proposed must include social grants for the 
able-bodied poor (a suggestion that fundamentalists reject). Grants, they 
say, without the courtesy of any supporting evidence, cause ‘dependency’ 
– grants are ‘consumption’ when what ‘we’ need is investment. The latter 
proposition, invariably made by a well-fed commentator, is often cast in 
terms of the fish and fishing-rod parable. 
 
Six years ago, the Taylor Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive 
Social Security recommended the phased introduction of a universal 
social grant. It did so in full awareness of the strong likelihood that a BIG 
cannot be made large enough to eradicate poverty. The Committee 
claimed, with appropriate empirical support, that a BIG can, however, 
significantly reduce poverty’s severity. 
 
In a variety of mealy-mouthed ways, government rejected the proposal. 
Instead, and with much fanfare, and inspired by the Millennium 
Development Goals, government resorted to two slogans – halving 
poverty and halving unemployment by 2014 (they featured prominently 
in the ANC’s 2004 election manifesto). As I have demonstrated 
elsewhere (Meth, 2006a; 2008a), in the unlikely event that the policies 
implemented to halve unemployment were to succeed, there would still 
be almost three million officially unemployed and perhaps another two 
million discouraged by the end year (2014). The halving poverty story is 
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even worse – there are indications of extreme confusion in government 
about what it is, that has to be achieved. Not only is the base year whose 
levels of poverty are to be halved, not spelled out anywhere, government 
understanding of the achievements of recent years, is blighted by a 
misplaced faith in a set of overly-optimistic estimates of progress. These 
results, from the van der Berg et al stable in Stellenbosch University 
(2005; 2007a; 2007b), and the methodology used to derive them, have 
been critically examined in Meth (2006b; 2007a; 2008b).vi 
 
Until growth comes along and rescues them, South Africa’s able-bodied 
poor are to be sustained instead by a ‘massified’ Expanded Public Works 
Programme (EPWP), and a number of other smaller initiatives, all 
important and many quite innovative.vii Taken together, however, the 
EPWP plus these initiatives, pale into insignificance in the face of the 
problem of mass unemployment, a major cause of mass poverty (Karuri 
et al, 2007). Regardless of the resources thrown at the EPWP, the largest 
direct intervention in the employment creation sphere, attempts to 
‘massify’ it are foredoomed by institutional constraints, most notably a 
lack of capacity in all spheres of government. These ensure that the 
EPWP can never amount to much more than a shadow of the ‘guaranteed 
work’ programmesviii currently being explored in countries like India and 
elsewhere (which is not to suggest that those programmes do not have 
problems of their own).ix 
 
Some may object that the Display Test, with its three possible outcomes, 
candid; ignorant or posturer, is unduly harsh. Be that as it may, applying 
it to the unwillingness of senior politicians to countenance the 
construction of a truly comprehensive social grant system, and their 
insistence instead on saving South Africa’s unemployed poor through 
growth, with a little help from the ‘social wage’ and the extended public 
works programme (EPWP), one can find only one prominent politician 
who passes, the Minister of Social Development, Zola Skweyiya. At the 
end of 2006, he ‘came out in support of a basic income grant’ (‘Skweyiya 
calls for basic income grant’, Mail & Guardian online, 10th November 
2006). In the ensuing furore, he ‘stuck to his guns’ (‘Skweyiya sticks by 
his call for basic income grant’, Mail & Guardian online, 20th November 
2006). Then, on 7th December 2006, an article under the heading ‘Cabinet 
pours cold water on basic income grant’ appeared in the Mail & 
Guardian (online edition). The article went on to say that Cabinet turned: 
 
‘…instead to ways to find “exit strategies” to reduce reliance on social 
grants.’ 
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The article said that ‘… the Cabinet had noted a proposal for linking 
social grants to poverty alleviation initiatives and other economic 
activities. 
 
But it said the beneficiaries of social grants – ‘most of whom are able-
bodied individuals’ -- would be given incentives linked to exit 
strategies. 
 
‘These would include skills development and participation in labour 
intensive programmes such as the extended public works 
programme.’x 
 
In recent times, this meagre arsenal has had added to it, a proposal for a 
wage subsidy. It is considered further below. 
 
Since about 2001, the severity of poverty has fallen. Nobody has 
succeeded, however, in demonstrating that this is due to the jobs being 
created for the poor. Rather, such amelioration as has occurred, appears to 
have been the result of the increase in the number of social grant 
recipients (by 2007, eight million child support grants were being 
disbursed each month – in April 2001, the number was about 975 000). 
According to the Budget Review 2007, in the poorest 20 per cent of 
households, the proportion whose main source of income was salaries 
and/or wages, fell from 25 per cent in 2002, to 18 per cent in 2005. The 
proportion relying mainly on social grants rose from 16 per cent to 40 per 
cent. In the second poorest quintile, the proportion of households whose 
main income source was salaries and/or wages rose slightly over the 
period (from 29 per cent to 32 per cent). Whereas social grants were cited 
by 31 per cent of households as the main income source in 2002, by 2005, 
this had risen to almost 50 per cent. The income source whose decline 
was greatest, was remittances (2007, p.101). 
 
In 2006, about one-third of all households in South Africa, home to more 
than 16 million of the country’s total population of about 47 million, 
contained no workers. Consumption levels in all except a minority of 
one- and two-person households, were below a modest poverty line of 
about R14 per capita per day. More than 85 per cent of these households 
contained people of working age, 2.4 million of whom were officially 
unemployed, while a further 1.6 million reported that they wanted to 
work, but had not actively sought jobs, mainly because they believed 
there were none to be had. Most of them had never enjoyed the luxury of 
a ‘proper’ job, and nearly all had been unemployed for longer than a year. 
About 45 per cent of the ‘never employed befores’ were in the age cohort 
12 BASIC INCOME GRANT: THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE! 
15-24 years, with about 40 per cent in the cohort 25-34 years. Among the 
‘unemployed for longer than a year’, the percentages were 33 and 38 
respectively.xi Clearly, South Africa’s problem is not simply one of youth 
unemployment, as is sometimes claimed.xii Widely held to be 
unemployable,xiii these people are, for a variety of reasons, likely to be at 
the tail-end of the job queue. Growth, if it benefits them at all, will only 
do so after it has drawn in the better qualified (in all the senses in which 
this may be understood). 
 
FAILING THE DISPLAY TEST: ASGISA AND THE HARVARD 
BOYS? 
 
Governments everywhere are forever announcing new initiatives, 5-point 
plans, 12-point plans, think of any number below, say, 20, and some 
government, somewhere, will have announced a plan with as many 
bullet-points in it, often aimed at pulling the country out of some severe 
crisis. South Africa is no exception. In February 2006, the Deputy-
President unveiled the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for 
South Africa (AsgiSA). Growing out of the commitment to halve poverty 
and unemployment by 2014, AsgiSA had, as one of its components, the 
South Africa Growth Initiative, a project located in the Center for 
International Development in Harvard University. Taking part in what 
Bill Easterly (2002), former World Bank development specialist, 
described as ‘The Elusive Quest for Growth’, the eminent economists 
participating in the project have recently (May) issued their final report 
(Hausmann, 2008). The report offers an impressively long list of 
recommendations (21 of them) for tackling growth constraints. If 
newspaper reports are to be believed,xiv however, government’s reception 
of the report is located at the lukewarm end of the spectrum. 
 
Although it is not the intention to engage extensively here with AsgiSA 
or with the Harvard team’s association with the initiative, the way that the 
project has operated, opens a window onto a topic not often addressed in 
the world of ‘expert analysis and advice’, namely, that of accountability. 
AsgiSA is well on the way to failing the Display Test. Its concern, as 
noted above, is with seeking ways to ensure that the halving poverty and 
halving unemployment goals are met. The principal means is ‘accelerated 
and shared’ growth. Growth, it is important to bear in mind, is a means, 
not an end in itself. Although the AsgiSA document recognises the 
severity of South Africa’s poverty problem (on p.4 of the 2006 AsgiSA 
document, reference is made to the one-third of households ‘… not yet 
able to benefit directly from our economic advances’), it does not to say 
what should be done, if, when all the experts have finished pawing over 
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the data, the policy measures they recommend do not do the job. Instead, 
the AsgiSA document ends with this astounding claim: 
 
‘Our second decade of freedom will be the decade in which we 
radically reduce inequality and virtually eliminate poverty. We know 
now that we can do it, working together around an initiative which has 
the support of the nation.’ (AsgiSA, 2006, p.16) 
 
It is easy to dismiss this as political puffery. To do so, however, would be 
a mistake, for it is likely that there are many senior figures in the ANC 
(and in business?) who actually believe this stuff. That belief, in turn, 
probably helps to inform the ANC’s approach to social protection – since 
poverty will shortly be eradicated, the argument must run, it is not 
necessary to extend the social grant system much beyond children and the 
aged – not only is it not necessary – to do so would only reinforce 
tendencies towards dependence.xv 
 
What should be the stance of a high-powered research team like that 
assembled for Harvard’s South Africa Growth Initiative towards the 
AsgiSA? Presumably their terms of reference, or the memorandum of 
understanding between them and government made no reference to 
redistribution or social protection policy – AsgiSA is, after all, concerned 
with relaxing the ‘binding constraints’ that prevent growth of the desired 
level from being attained. Consistent with this, the Harvard final report 
makes no reference to poverty. It notes in passing that inequality is 
high,xvi and speculates a little on the effects on inequality of (a) relaxing 
skill constraints, and (b) the relationship of black economic 
empowerment (BEE) to the skill shortage. It does not say – hey! hang on 
a minute – these are our recommendations, but what are you 
(government) going to do if they do not deliver the desired growth, or, if 
they do deliver the desired rate of growth, but cannot deliver on the 
‘shared’ part of it? The absence of such a caution is odd. Some of the 
constraints identified by the Harvard group are formidable, lending the 
report an air of pessimism. Not only does the report itself state that ‘… 
the growth acceleration observed since 2004 does not appear to be 
externally sustainable’ (Hausmann, 2008, p.3), but not long before it was 
released, other members of the Harvard team had published a policy brief 
which stated that potential output growth was in the region of 3-4.5 per 
cent, quite a long way below government’s desired six per cent per 
annumxvii (Frankel and Sturzenegger, 2008). 
 
Some of the Harvard recommendations could be implemented relatively 
quickly – others could not. The year 2014 is a scant six years away – why 
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would a researcher participating in a project whose creators expect it to 
achieve the impossible goal of ‘virtually eliminating poverty’ by 2014, 
not want to create some distance between themselves and the inevitable 
failure to realise that goal? Of course, they can always turn around 
afterwards and say, truthfully, that there were no promises, no certainties 
that their package of recommendations would necessarily succeed (apart 
from which, government is unlikely to have implemented all of them 
anyway). Such a claim would, however, only make matters worse – if 
there are no guarantees, and if there is a possibility of failure (defined as 
falling short of the desired outcome – halving poverty and 
unemployment), and if this failure places intended beneficiaries of the 
policies in a worse position than they might have been under a different 
policy regime, then it is incumbent upon those making the policy 
recommendations to make this known. In short, the final report does not 
do well on the Display Test. 
 
Remarkably deaf to constructive criticism of its efforts at addressing 
poverty, the South African government is not easily deflected from its 
chosen path. Even so, one cannot but wish that given their standing, the 
Harvard team had seen fit to confront government more resolutely over 
the question of possible (likely) failure (or at best, only partial success). 
Do they subscribe to some unspoken rule in terms of which, as 
consultants, they do not stray outside of the confines of a set of terms of 
reference, even if there is a possibility that the advice they offer will not 
lead to the desired goals being achieved? Or is there something about the 
ideological predispositions of (some of) the Harvard team members that 
prevented them from even considering these issues, let alone being more 
confrontational about them?xviii They clearly are not afraid of 
controversy, as their critique of the way that BEE (which they 
acknowledge to be desirable, but if successful, ultimately redundan
designed and implemented in South Africa, shows. Is it the case that 
despite all the concessions to the ‘necessary but not sufficient’ stories 
about growth, they are unwilling even to consider further redistributio
through 
t) is 
n 
the fiscus? 
 
Giving a provocative heading to this section of the paper was not done 
merely to be sensationalist – nor was it done to suggest that the Harvard 
group has anything in common with ‘los Chicago boys’,xix nasty 
extension of the seamier side of US foreign policy that they were. Rather, 
the intention is to show why it is necessary for economists to join the 
conversation about the ethics of dispensing advice (especially if one is 
giving advice about giving advice). Starting this paper with a pair of 
ethical propositions (the first explicit – attend to the neediest first; the 
second implicit – policy should be formulated in such a way as to pass the 
Display Test) announces a particular stance towards social policy. It 
grows out of a long-held belief that those making policy 
recommendations on the basis of their social scientific analytical skills, 
have a responsibility to do so in a manner that would satisfy ethical 
precepts similar to those informing professional practice in other 
disciplines, medicine being a case in point. A good starting point is with 
the maxims of primum non nocere (first, do no harm), or primum 
succurrere (first, hasten to help, as in the case of the terminally ill). 
Tracing the originator of the first of these, commonly but apparently 
mistakenly believed to have been Hippocrates, Smith (2005), points out 
that although as a: 
 
‘… general maxim for medical practice this “do no harm axiom” is 
deficient … [it] can serve as a potent reminder that all clinical and 
pharmacological decisions carry the potential for harm.’ (2005, p.375) 
 
Exploring its deficiency, Smith cites the words of a pioneering 
pharmacologist, Lou Lasagna, whose verdict on the ‘do no harm’ maxim 
reads as follows: 
 
‘To observe this advice literally is to deny important therapy to 
everyone, since only inert nostrums can be guaranteed to do no harm. 
It is more reasonable to ask doctors to balance the potential gains 
against the possible harm; would that we could only quantify these 
probabilities more precisely!’ (2005, p.375) 
 
For the word ‘doctors’, substitute ‘social and economic policy makers 
and advisors’, and we have the beginnings of a set of guidelines.xx Just as 
drugs have side effects (some, like those caused by chemotherapy, being 
extremely unpleasant, and almost unavoidable) and surgery is inescapably 
invasive, so many (most?) economic and social policies entail trade-offs. 
The sacrifices that have to be made by one group are held to be justified 
by the benefits that (should) accrue to the target group.xxi The medical 
profession shares with its colleagues in the social sciences the difficulty 
of ‘quantifying more precisely’, and that is where one area where trouble 
starts. All too often, policymakers are bombarded with conflicting 
analyses and prescriptions that are the result of differing interpretations of 
the same empirical data. South Africa is no exception – the lack of 
agreement on the extent and severity of poverty, and the absence of 
secure knowledge about the trajectory of inequality, encourages those in 
power to believe the best, and some of those in opposition, the opposite. 
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Under such circumstances, what is to be done? The ‘do no harm’ maxim 
sparked a rash of inquiries in the 1990s, spanning many disciplines, from 
humanitarian aid,xxii to education (Smith, 2005, p.375), to business ethics 
(Baron, 1996). The latter paper offers an interesting analysis of possible 
answers to the: 
 
‘… fundamental moral question … about the advice we give each 
other about what to do, about what choices to make.’ (1996, p.198) 
 
Baron contrasts a simple utilitarian view which holds that ‘… moral 
obligations depend on expected consequences’, with a ‘constraint-based 
ethical system’ that distinguishes between ‘act’ and ‘omission’. This 
distinction, he argues, imparts to moral intuition (‘judgements about cases 
and principles’) a systematic bias. It is illustrated by a number of studies 
that reveal an asymmetry between the judgement of an act that causes 
harm, as opposed to an omission which also allows the same harm to be 
caused, the former attracting uniform opprobrium, the latter (often), none 
at all. Circumstances in which omission was tolerable tended to vary 
between cultures (the doctrine of laissez faire tolerates omission without 
great difficulty), and with the proximity of the relationship between the 
individuals concerned. Dealing as it does with the complexities of moral 
action in a highly complex world, the argument is considerably more 
dense than the hints given above suggest. For our purposes here, though, 
only one thing matters, and that is that when an omission may have 
harmful consequences, regardless of who it is that may be affected, there 
is an onus on researchers to explore and to disclose those consequences. It 
may well be (and often is) the case that the ‘do no harm’ principle has to 
be flouted for the greater good. The harm that is likely to be done should, 
however, still be exposed. 
 
Regardless of the limits placed by terms of reference on consultants, 
those whose recommendations are in danger of being implemented, have 
a duty to consider the implications of the possible failure of those 
recommendations. If the fundamental moral question is what advice do 
we give each other, mine would be that consultants ought not to allow 
themselves to be constrained by the often arbitrary boundaries, created by 
the terms of reference of the projects in which they are involved – 
participation in a project intended to yield policy recommendations means 
doing enough to pass the Display Test. Sometimes ‘enough’ may not be 
very much – the Harvard team could have scraped through merely by 
presenting an honest assessment of the likelihood of the growth that it is 
reasonable to foresee in South Africa achieving the AsgiSA goals. All 
told, the Harvard project yielded 20 papers – if the probability of success 
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is as slender as the tone in one or two of them suggests, then the team 
should have insisted that government commission studies on alternative 
approaches to alleviating poverty.xxiii In a project as important as this, 
caveats deserve the prominence which only an appearance in the final 
report can hope to secure, for that is the document most people are likely 
to consult. Policymakers are frequently under extreme pressure, hence the 
oft-repeated call for a two- or three-page brief. All the more reason then, 
to ensure that health warnings cannot be missed. 
 
As far as AsgiSA’s compilers are concerned, the obvious defence against 
a charge of failing the Display Test they could offer, would be the 
argument that those whom growth cannot rescue will be taken care of by 
the country’s ‘comprehensive’ social security system. If the system, 
existing and proposed, offered a plausible plan for dealing with the large 
number of able-bodied poor whom growth will not save from poverty, 
such a riposte would be justified. As it is though, no such plan exists – 
without it, and without any contemplation of failure in the AsgiSA 
document, AsgiSA fails not only the Display Test, it fails the ‘reasonable 
measures test’ as well. 
 
Modest labour market interventions 
Whatever one may think of the Harvard package as a whole, the 
recommended labour market interventions probably avoid having to face 
the full rigour of the Display Test, because they do not lay claim to being 
much more than proposals to ‘alleviate’ unemployment. Providing the bar 
is set low enough, success in this case may not prove to be too elusive. 
The major recommendation is a wage subsidy for which new entrants 
become eligible when they turn 18 years of age. The subsidy would take 
the form of a once-off deposit of, say, R5000 into a special account for 
each young person turning 18 years of age. This could be drawn down by 
a participating employer and used to pay part of the wage. Author of the 
labour market paper, James Levinsohn (2008), estimates that if the 
subsidy were set at that amount, it could cost about R3.75 billion per 
annum in any year for the 18-year-olds (of whom there would obviously 
be a ‘fresh supply’ each year). A subsidy for all those turning 18 would 
not, of course, make any impression on the existing stock of unemployed. 
Discussing the group to be targeted when (and if) such a policy were 
introduced, Levinsohn suggests that there are ‘arguments for including all 
individuals up to the age of 30 for men and perhaps even 40 for women in 
the initial roll-out’.xxiv Armed with knowledge of population distributions 
by age, and of age-specific unemployment rates, and making some 
assumptions about take-up rates (Levinsohn offers 75 per cent, for 
argument’s sake), one can make educated guesses at the cost of the 
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proposal for a variety of subsidy levels. That is interesting, but not as 
interesting as speculation on the rate at which the stock of unemployed 
could be absorbed into employment (in which Levinsohn does not 
engage). 
 
Assume that the economy’s performance of the past few years of creating 
roughly 500 000 new jobs each year (in the absence of wage subsidies) 
can be sustained for a decade. Growth of the working-age population is 
about 390 000 a year. Labour force growth is erratic in the extreme, but if 
the participation rate, including the discouraged, is approaching 70 per 
cent, then, on average, about 270 000 of each year’s increase, make their 
way, sooner or later, into the labour market. Job growth would thus 
reduce the stock of unemployed by about 230 000 per annum. Assuming 
that the growth in the working age population and the changes in the 
participation rate observed over the period 2003-2007 continue into the 
future, then, with somewhat over seven million jobless, getting the 
expanded unemployment rate down to a tolerable ten per cent by 2018 
would entail the creation of almost 800 000 jobs each year for a decade. 
The unemployed would then number about 2½ million (probably still 
located in workerless households). Whether such an achievement would 
be politically acceptable cannot, of course, be determined by social 
scientists or politicians. They may set the targets, but the ultimate test is 
conducted (not in any organised manner) by the ‘people’ – as we have 
seen in recent times, the people are not overly impressed by government’s 
recitation of the number of housing subsidies provided, or water 
connections made, as a response to their pleas. 
 
Objections to the calculations made above on the grounds that it is only 
the officially unemployed who should enter the calculus may satisfy 
pedantic politicians – they are unlikely to do anything other than inflame 
passions among the poor. More than three quarters of the discouraged 
unemployed (all of whom express their desire to work by saying they are 
willing to accept a job in less than 4 weeks) give as their reason for not 
working ‘Cannot find any work’. 
 
Suppose that Levinsohn’s proposal for the target population at start-up is 
adopted. Then, using the 2006 figures for illustrative purposes, in 
addition to the crop of 18 year-olds, there would be about 1.9 million men 
aged between 19 and 30 years, and 3.8 million women from 19 to 40 
years, eligible for the subsidy. Numbers of unemployed have fallen a 
little since 2006, but not by as much as to make the sudden presence of 
somewhere near five or six million people milling around the labour 
market, waving wage subsidies, anything other than shocking. Except in 
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the fictional world of bourgeois economics with its instantly clearing 
markets, absorbing these people will take many years. 
 
Two conditions must be met in order for the wage subsidy to have even a 
ghost of a chance of succeeding. The first has to do with labour 
legislation in South Africa. Business has long claimed that the law is too 
restrictive – getting rid of incompetent workers (and retrenching in a 
downturn) are both argued to inhibit employment creation. There is 
evidence to support the claim.xxv The second is more nebulous. Lurking 
behind the wage subsidy proposal must be the proposition that there are 
millions of jobs potentially available, mainly in low-skill occupations, 
which could be filled if only the existing labour supply acquired the 
rudimentary skills necessary to carry out the work.xxvi Employers, in this 
view of the world, are inhibited from dipping into the huge pool of 
unemployed, because (a) they cannot easily discover which applicants are 
trainable, and (b) training them (possibly even in the most basic skills) is 
costly – outlays on training would not be easy to recover. Employing 
low-productivity workers in a climate where unions play a significant role 
in setting wages, is thus not economically feasible. Creating a supply of 
‘suitable’ labour, the argument must run, will uncover the latent demand 
for it (is this an instance of Say’s Law in operation?). Obviously, the 
impact of releasing these constraints (making firing easy, and subsidising 
low-productivity workers through their first year or so of employment) on 
employment levels is impossible to estimate, something that Levinsohn 
acknowledges (2008, p.16). 
 
In the face of an inability to say how many jobs could be created by these 
means, Levinsohn offers the only sensible suggestion he can, namely, that 
the proposal be tested by means of pilot programmes with subsidies of 
varying levels (2008, p.17). It is, however, going to be several years 
before the effectiveness of subsidies can be known. In the meanwhile, 
most of the unemployed will remain in that state. The saddest part of this 
story is that precious years have been lost due to government dithering. 
The wage subsidy proposal is not new – in the 2001 budget, for example, 
government set aside R600 million as a ‘wage incentive’. The Budget 
Review observed that the Treasury and SARS set themselves the task of: 
 
‘… investigating economically and administratively efficient tax 
measures that will: 
• Encourage job creation by reducing the cost of hiring new workers 
and of offering learnerships.xxvii 
• Encourage the formalisation of employment that is currently in the 
informal sector. This will have positive effects on other 
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government programmes – for example, the UIF – and ensure their 
benefits are more widely available.’ (National Treasury, 2001, 
p.77) 
 
Treasury invited interested bodies to make a pitch for the money – as far 
as I can recall, it was turned over to the Department of Labour, to fund 
learnerships. 
 
Whether or not the results of the pilot programmes Levinsohn proposes 
are capable of indicating that the subsidy programme could be 
successfully scaled up to make roll-out at a national level possible, is not 
considered. Since he makes it clear that the details of implementation are 
beyond the scope of the study (2008, p.14), he can hardly be criticised for 
failing to do so. If the proposal were subjected to the ‘Display Test’ it 
would probably squeak through, because of Levinsohn’s precaution of 
recommending tests of the wage subsidy proposal before mass 
implementation, and because of the apparently limited ambitions of the 
proposals implicit in his paper’s title ‘Two Policies to Alleviate 
Unemployment in South Africa’. In its present form, though, the proposal 
is still at such a preliminary stage as to make it inappropriate, as noted 
above, to put it to the test. Any policymaker, however, who takes up the 
wage subsidy without exhaustive evaluation of its merits and without due 
consideration of the steps to be taken in the event of its failing to match 
up to expectations, ruling out in the process other alternatives that may 
yield greater welfare, would be in danger of failing the Display Test. That 
has not happened yet – what we have in the meanwhile is more beating of 
the growth drum. 
 
HOW IS ANTI-POVERTY POLICY MADE? 
 
Growth fundamentalism is promoted, knowingly or otherwise, at the very 
highest levels of government. On 21st May, 2008, The Growth Report, the 
fruit of two year’s labour led by a Commission consisting of ‘experienced 
policy, government and business leaders … and two renowned 
economists’ (South Africa’s Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, was a 
member of the Commission), was published.xxviii On the 22nd May 2008, 
the Cape Times published an article on the report by the Minister, under 
the heading ‘Unlocking the rapid growth that is our only hope for 
reducing poverty’ (p.9). That headline may be the creation of the paper’s 
sub-editors – if so, they are not misrepresenting the Minister – this is 
what he wrote: 
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‘No country has been able to sustainably reduce poverty without rapid 
growth.’xxix 
 
Had he said that ‘no lower middle-income country has been able to 
eradicate poverty without sustained growth’, the Minister would have 
been on safer ground – it is a relatively simple matter to show that modest 
growth, if sustained, in a country like South Africa, with its relatively 
high income and its exceptionally high inequality, can (and indeed, 
already has), make a significant dent in poverty, and much more quickly 
than rapid distribution-neutral growth.xxx Given the intellectual standing 
of the Minister of Finance, not only in South Africa, but internationally, 
and the power of the National Treasury, it comes as little surprise to find 
arguments of the type cited above dominating the discourse. Amongst the 
(Harvard) experts whom the South African government has appointed to 
look at growth constraints, a slightly more nuanced assessment of the 
growth debate may be found. In a June 3rd 2008 posting on his weblog, 
Dani Rodrik (see end-note xxviii), extending the critique of Bill Easterly 
(discussed in that note), had this to say about The Growth Report: 
 
‘Contrary to what Prof Easterly argues, the report makes useful 
contributions to policymakers’ understanding. The most important is 
the emphasis on growth itself, underplayed by many advisers and 
activists in the 1990s and early 2000s. Growth is not everything. But it 
is the foundation for everything. The poorer the country the more 
important growth becomes, partly because it is impossible to 
redistribute nothing and partly because higher incomes make a huge 
difference to the welfare of the poorest.’ 
 
The crucial questions (and these are empirical matters) are (i) is it true 
that growth was underplayed, and if so, to what effect?, and (ii) how poor 
does a country have to be for it not to be able to redistribute anything? 
Where average income is less than 700 dollars per annum? (see note 
xxix) 
 
The challenge against the existing leadership in South Africa at 
Polokwane last year, had at its core the proposition that the poor had not 
been well served (despite the growth which ANC policy had made 
possible). The arguments were visceral, however, rather than analytical – 
those in the ANC who dispute the (simplistic) growth story are on the 
margins. There does not appear to be anyone in the party with influence, 
capable of making the simple point that (a) it may be worth sacrificing 
some growth, if need be, when the payoff is relatively rapid reduction of 
poverty, and that (b) a higher middle-income country, with monstrous 
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inequalities, could probably also eradicate poverty in the medium-term 
through a combination of modest growth and redistribution, if it were of a 
mind to do so. As we will see below, the emphasis on growth, coupled 
with a fear of ‘dependency’ that verges on the paranoid, conspire to keep 
ANC policy on the same track that has led to the widespread discontent, 
harnessed so successfully at Polokwane by the new leadership. 
 
So, until growth saves the poor, the major labour market components of 
anti-poverty policy are the EPWP, the skills drive, and the various 
learnership schemes.xxxi These may soon be buttressed by a wage subsidy 
of as yet undecided form, apparently favoured by Treasury.xxxii Apart 
from the warning by the Minister of Social Development that social 
grants were necessary because the ‘halving’ policies were inadequate, 
there is no indication that consideration has been given by senior 
politicians and policymakers to the (distinct) possibility that all of this is 
not enough. Nor does the buck stop there – although it is not entirely 
clear how policy in the ANC is decided, the Commission Reports and 
Draft Recommendations drawn up at the ANC National Conference in 
June 2007, are consistent with government utterances on the form that 
social protection against unemployment should take. The document 
expresses the beliefs that: 
 
‘36 We are building a developmental state and not a welfare state 
given that in welfare state (sic), dependency is profound 
37 Our attack on poverty must seek to empower people to take 
themselves out of poverty, while creating adequate social nets to 
protect the most vulnerable in our society. 
 
This results in, among others, a draft resolution to the effect that: 
 
44 Grants must not create dependency and thus must be linked to 
economic activity’ (ANC, 2007, p.13) 
 
Pontificating about ‘developmental states’ is all very well, but South 
Africa lacks the bureaucratic capability to link grants to economic activity 
in a manner that would provide social protection to all who need it (the 
able-bodied poor). Not only did the conference delegates fail to apply 
their minds adequately to this matter – they formulated instead, a 
resolution that is manifestly not capable of being implemented.xxxiii 
Delegates who supported it will be as culpable as policymakers, if (when) 
the anti-poverty policies fail. 
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The statement attributed to Cabinet when it rejected Minister Skweyiya’s 
call for a basic income grant, has been reported above. Part of the Cabinet 
statement made reference to ‘able-bodied beneficiaries of grants’. This is 
misleading. Since there are, at present, no grants for the able-bodied 
(unemployed) adult poor, the dependency of which the ANC so heartily 
disapproves, is actually benefit dilution (the sharing of categorical grants 
like the child support grant or the old age pension). One wonders how, in 
the absence of the grants, the people concerned would have survived? 
Paradoxically, the ANC government has conceded that social grants are 
one of the more effective ways of bringing relief to the poor. After 
boasting about the ‘community assets’ (2182 of them) left behind by 
‘R6.5 billion expenditure on infrastructure’, government acknowledges 
that: ‘… public works [the other ‘major’ anti-poverty programme] are not 
as efficient as income grants in alleviating income poverty’ (PCAS, 2003, 
p.19). 
 
Although Minister Skweyiya continues in his role as champion of the 
poor, the policy direction articulated at the June 2007 conference (it does 
not differ much from the party’s stance at previous conferences) acts as a 
constraint on what he can propose, apparently compelling him to depart 
from the ideal of a universal (non-means-tested grant). So much is clear 
in his Budget Vote Speech, delivered to the National Assembly on 30th 
May 2008, which refers to ‘basic income’, once more. Here is what he 
said: 
 
‘We currently distribute the CSG to over 8,6 million children. It is also 
our medium term aim to increase qualification age limit for the CSG 
up to the 18th birthday, resources willing and enabling. 
 
However, a world with a more human face requires us to guarantee 
further and sustainable employment and income opportunities for the 
parents and care givers of these children. As directed by the People’s 
Congress in Polokwane, we will table proposals on the phased 
introduction of conditional basic income support. Our attention will be 
focussed on the most vulnerable who survive outside our social 
security. This will break the cycle which has made poverty an 
inevitable intergenerational inheritance based on the station of one’s 
birth.’ 
 
Presumably, pressure to conform to Polokwane’s diktat xxxiv compels the 
Minister to talk of ‘conditional’ grants, and to direct attention to parents 
and care-givers, instead of the able-bodied poor in general. The latter, 
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however, and not only the parents and care-givers among them, make up 
the target group. 
 
As is the case elsewhere, and as has so frequently been the case in the 
past, the problem of providing social protection for the able-bodied poor 
– those capable of working, but unable to find employment,xxxv defies 
solution. There are no conditions capable of being enforced by this, or 
any other government with a problem similar to South Africa’s, to ensure 
that a ‘conditional basic income support’ lands up in the right hands. 
Although the able-bodied poor, like such obvious candidates for social 
protection as children, the aged (the infirm or disabled are more 
problematic), stand out as being particularly deserving of assistance, their 
problem, as far as the design of policy is concerned, is that unlike 
children, or pensioners, there is no distinctive characteristic by means of 
which they can be identified. Even if the ANC government were willing 
to give grants to the able-bodied unemployed poor, they would have great 
difficulty in devising the means by which to do so. It is thus not possible 
to close the hole in South Africa’s social protection system by the 
methods used in much-developed economies, methods such as welfare-
to-work (in the UK), or its more coercive counterpart ‘workfare’ (in the 
USA). (These policies could also not work in this country because the 
low-paying jobs into which to drive the poor do not exist in sufficient 
numbers). 
 
WAR OF PREPOSITION (WITH APOLOGIES TO GRAMSCI) 
 
Let us ignore, for a moment, the uncomfortable truth that the able-bodied 
poor cannot be identified, and pretend that an adequate method for doing 
so exists. It is a simple matter to show that rapid distribution-neutral 
economic growth that does not pull those at the bottom of the income 
distribution into employment, is inferior, in welfare terms for those 
groups, to slow growth with redistribution. This is illustrated in Table 1 
below. Growth rates have been manipulated to yield the desired results, 
but they are close to the sorts of figures bandied about in South Africa. 
Income estimates (gross income) from the 2005/2006 Income and 
Expenditure Survey, (Rands per capita per month in 2006 prices) have 
been used as a base on which to perform a few crude simulations.xxxvi 
Growth of the working-age population is assumed to be 1.2 per cent per 
annum. 
 
Although the first decade of democracy was marred by increasing 
unemployment, and with it, an increase in the numbers of workerless 
households, in general, economic growth does not proceed as in the 
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simulation whose results are reported below. We can expect at least some 
members of households in the poorest deciles to obtain employment. This 
will speed up the rate of poverty reduction. Nevertheless, it is important 
to spare a thought for the strictures of the labour market, in particular, 
those that determine the absorptive capacity in the short- to medium-term. 
With that in mind, let us revisit the hoary old debate about redistribution 
(and, with, through, before, after) growth. 
 
Four scenarios are considered, two are distribution neutral, and two 
engage in redistribution of differing degrees. Scenario 1 is rapid-growth 
distribution neutral, Scenario 2 is slow-growth distribution neutral, 
Scenario 3 is slow-growth with modest redistribution, and Scenario 4 is 
slow-growth with slightly more redistribution. In the redistributive 
scenarios, in which per capita income growth is held at 2.5 per cent per 
annum, the redistributions are achieved by taking income from the total 
that would have been received by those in decile 10 if per capita income 
growth had been 2.5 per cent per annum, and redistributing it to those in 
deciles 1, 2 and 3. 
 
An arbitrary poverty line of R432 per capita per month, derived from the 
Hoogeveen and Özler (2004) figure of R322 (in 2000 prices), is used to 
show when individuals climb out of poverty. For the fast-growth option, 
eight years of income growth (to the symbolically important year of 
2014) at roughly five per cent per annum (about 6.2 per cent GDP growth 
corrected for assumed population growth), are enough to place the 
individual in decile 3 with a mean income of R433 just out of poverty’s 
reach – the roughly 50 per cent of people with mean incomes lower than 
this, obviously, are still in poverty.xxxvii Whereas in 2006, all 11.6 million 
people in the bottom three deciles were below the poverty line, by 2014, 
this would have fallen to 9.5 million out of a population of 11.8 million. 
By about 2018, about half of the 3.9 million people in decile 2 would 
have climbed above the poverty line, along with the remainder of those in 
decile three who were below it in 2014. In this scenario, the folk in the 
bottom decile are still well the poverty line in 2022. 
 
In the second scenario, if it is assumed that per capita income growth is 
the same across the whole distribution (2.5 per cent per annum), then 
GDP growth (crudely, income growth plus population growth) slips to 
about 3.7 per cent per annum over the sixteen year period. This is just 
enough to raise half of the members of decile 3 above the poverty line by 
2022. Everyone else is still below the line by that year. 
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Table 1 Trickle-down with rapid growth vs. slow growth with 
redistribution 
 
Bottom 
decile Decile 2 Decile 3 
Top 
decile 
Average household size 2.8 3.3 3.8 3.6 
5% growth per annum – distribution neutral (Scenario 1) 
2006 128 242 292  9 390 
2014 190 358 432  13 894 
2022 281 530 639  20 560 
Percentage increase in income 2006-2022 119.0 119.0 119.0 119.0 
2.5% growth per annum – distribution neutral (Scenario 2) 
2006 128 242 292  9 390 
2014 156 295 355  11 441 
2022 191 360 433  13 939 
Percentage increase in income 2006-2022 48.5 48.5 48.5 48.5 
2.5% growth per annum – with re-distribution (Scenario 3) 
2006 128 242 292  9 390 
2014 190 358 432  11 276 
2022 281 530 639  13 495 
Percentage increase in income 2006-2022 119.0 119.0 119.0 43.7 
2.5% growth per annum – with re-distribution (Scenario 4) 
2006 128 242 292  9 390 
2014 281 432 482 11 085 
2022 432 530 580 13 440 
Percentage increase in income 2006-2022 236.5 118.8 98.9 43.1 
Sources: Incomes. Statistics South Africa, 2008, p.32. 
Average household size (expenditure deciles): P0100, 4 March 2008, p.72. 
Notes: 
Per capita incomes in the base year were estimated by dividing household incomes by 
average household size. The latter refers to the number of all individuals – children working-
age adults and those of pensionable age, in the household. 
Deciles are of households. Varying household size means that the numbers of individuals in 
each decile are not equal. Household sizes by expenditure decile rather than income decile 
were used because published data on the latter were not available at the time the calculations 
were performed. The differences are unlikely to have much influence on the results, of what 
is, in any event, a purely speculative exercise. 
 
Scenario 3 – slow growth with redistribution – shows how it is possible to 
achieve the same results for the poor as those yielded by the fast growth 
of scenario 1. Of course, as long as it is ecologically sustainable, six or 
seven, or even eight per cent growth per annum would be preferable. If 
that cannot be achieved, or if a growth spurt like that experienced in 
South Africa in the past couple of years, splutters to a halt, the wellbeing 
of the poor need not be sacrificed. The cost, to those in decile 10, of 
ensuring that this is so, can readily be estimated from the figures for 
scenarios 2 and 3. The heartlessness of ‘trickle-down’ (distribution 
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neutral) growth is plain to see in panel 2 – 16 year’s sustained GDP 
growth at 3.7 per cent per annum is just sufficient to raise about 2.2 
million people in decile 3 out of poverty. Scenario 3 suggests that if by 
2014, each individual in decile 10 sacrifices just R165 per month out of 
the R2051 increase in income they enjoy over the period 2006-2014, the 
poor can be brought to the same condition as 6.2 per cent GDP growth 
would have placed them. The sacrifice required to produce a similar 
effect by 2022 is R444 per month per individual out of an income 
increase of R2499 per month between 2014 and 2022. 
 
Another way of looking at this is to allow all per capita incomes to grow 
by 48.5 per cent over the period 2006-2022, then subtract from the total 
income of those in the 10th decile sufficient income to bring income 
growth over the period in deciles 1, 2 and 3 back up to 119 per cent, i.e., 
the percentage by which it would have grown if the rate of growth had 
been steady at about five per cent per annum. Doing so would mean that 
income growth in the decile 10, instead of being 48.5 per cent, would 
amount to 43.7 per cent over the period. 
 
In scenario 4, redistribution is taken a little further, lower down the scale. 
The average individual in decile 3 emerges from poverty in 2008, their 
counterpart in decile 2 by 2014, and in decile 3 by 2022. Income growth 
rates have been made to fall sharply from decile 1 to decile 3 (they were 
equal in scenario 3), to give robust pro-poor (inequality-reducing) growth 
rather than the weak imitation of it, where all incomes rise by the same 
proportion. The difference in income growth in the 10th decile, if scenario 
4, rather than scenario 3 changes could be brought about, is just over half-
of one per cent over 16 years (or a mere R55 per capita per month). 
Instead of the absolute differences between mean incomes in the tenth 
and first deciles at the end of the period being the R20 279 that it is in 
scenario 1, or the R13 749 it is in scenario 2, and the R13 214 it would be 
in scenario 3, the scenario 4 redistribution yields a difference of R13 008 
(per capita per month, that is!). 
 
For the fast-growth scenario over the period of 16 years, the ratio of the 
increase in decile 10 incomes to the value of decile 1 incomes is 40:1. 
Even under conditions of slow growth, in the absence of redistribution on 
the scale proposed here (and it is not suggested that it is adequate), the 
ratio is almost 24:1. The redistribution in scenario 3 would reduce this to 
a little below 15:1, while that in scenario 4 knocks it down to a little over 
9:1. Recall now what this ratio represents: the increase in the value of the 
income in the top income group, to the total value of income received in 
the bottom income group.xxxviii 
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In a country where inequality is as bad as it is in South Africa, and where 
the failure to reduce it is polarising the society along lines that are as rigid 
as they are invisible, it is surely not unreasonable to demand sacrifices of 
the sort spelled out in scenario 4? Recent events have shown how 
completely alienated the poor are from those who have prospered since 
the advent of democracy. The shock of the violent and misguided 
response to the immigrants among the poor, where it has not simply 
reinforced racist prejudice, has probably brought about a clearer 
understanding than ever before of the dangers of allowing poverty and 
inequality to fester on, unchallenged, for so many years. 
 
BUT WE CANNOT IDENTIFY THE ABLE-BODIED POOR! 
 
If only real life were so simple – the poor in workerless households 
would be identified – the well-off would support government’s attempts 
to alleviate poverty and would pay the additional tax without a whisper of 
complaint about punishing the wealth creators and so on, and so on. 
Neither, unfortunately, is true. The able-bodied poor, as was noted above, 
have none of the distinguishing characteristics so necessary for the 
successful running of bureaucratic systems. Someone who is poor and 
unemployed is distinguishable from someone who has a flourishing 
informal-economy business, only by close observation. Someone who is 
poor but has no desire to work because they can live off grandma’s 
pension and brother Freddy’s disability allowance, is also 
indistinguishable, except by close observation, from someone who is poor 
and is desperately seeking work. 
 
This is the central problem of social grant systems. If a grant of say, R500 
per month were made available to all the unemployed, rational economic 
calculation performed by people working long hours for low wages is 
likely to cause some large number to become ‘unemployed’ rather rapidly 
in order to claim the benefit (recall that R432 per month was barely 
enough to maintain one person in 2006). Table 2 gives an indication of 
the sectors where people most at risk are located. Certainly all of those 
earning R500 per month or less would be tempted, and possibly many of 
those earning less than R1000 per month, whose opportunity costs of 
accepting employment are high (e.g., high transport and child care costs). 
 
Government’s current investigation into the possibility of paying a grant 
to former recipients of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits who have 
exhausted their entitlements, represents an attempt to reach the only 
group among the unemployed who have the characteristic of 
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identifiability, so necessary for the task of excluding the ineligible. 
Qualifying for a categorical grant is not always a simple matter. The 
difficulties that applicants face, however, differ significantly according to 
the type of grant sought. One has merely to compare the relative ease 
with which eligibility for child support grants and old age pensions may 
be demonstrated (age being the primary criterion), with the difficulties 
involved in established eligibility for a disability grant, or a foster care 
grant, to see that this is so. Proving, to the satisfaction of the authorities, 
when one is able-bodied, that not only is one unemployed, but also that 
one has taken all possible steps to find employment (or start a business), 
is more difficult still, and by several orders of magnitude. 
 
Table 2 Workers aged 15-65 years (1000s), by monthly income and 
sector 
Monthly income Formal Informal Domestic Total 
Total 12 908 2718 1075 16 816 
None 28 284 0 314 
R1-R500 281 619 253 1156 
R501-R1000 975 559 421 1971 
Sub-total 1284 1462 674 3441 
     
R1001-R2500 2850 640 349 3864 
R8001+ 1410 47 0 1471 
Don't know/refused 706 51 13 773 
Unspecified 44 13 0 103 
Total – all workers 12 908 2718 1075 16 816 
     
Workers below R1000 as % of total 9.9 53.8 62.7 20.5 
Source: September 2007 LFS, Statistical release P0210, 27 March 2008, Table 3.5, p.18. 
Note: Workers are employers, employees and the self-employed 
 
What to do about the ‘able-bodied poor’ is a question to which answers 
have been sought by policymakers for many centuries. In England, for 
example, a draft bill in 1535 proposed public works as a solution to the 
problem of unemployment. By 1834, the awful Poor Law Amendment 
Act in that country introduced the principle of ‘less eligibility’, in terms 
of which the value of the poverty relief granted to any able-bodied poor 
person was to be lower than the lowest wage paid anywhere in the 
economy. The rationale behind this brutal principle was that of not 
distorting the labour market. 
 
Public works, as was noted above in the discussion about South Africa’s 
EPWP, have lost none of their charm, as far as policymakers are 
concerned. If this programme were a serious contender for the role of 
social protection mechanism for the long-term unemployed (a role for 
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which it is not particularly well-suited), the nightmares of the wage-
setting process would soon dampen the ardour of those given to mindless 
EPWP promotion. Public works are supposed to have the virtue of being 
self-targeting – only those truly in need would (should?) be prepared to 
work for the low wages on offer (unlike social grants, this targeting 
mechanism requires no elaborate bureaucratic structures). If the wage is 
‘too generous’, i.e., does not conform to something like the Poor Law 
principle of less eligibility, then the cold realities of the labour market 
take over and flood the programme with low-wage workers, keen to 
escape the hardship of their day-to-day struggles, in favour of ‘easy 
money’ from the government. Reasonably intelligent guesses (and that is 
all that can be done to ‘estimate’ likely programme participants) of the 
likely numbers so attracted, can be made by referring to Table 2 above. 
 
Government as employer of last resort will not work – not only are the 
numbers involved huge, how huge it is not possible to say – but 
government, for all the boasting about the EPWP being on target (see 
their website) lacks the capacity to administer the existing programme, let 
alone one that is ten or more times as big (for that is what is required). 
Growth cannot happen fast enough to rescue the poor, and government 
(and the ANC-in-conference, seriously out of touch with reality), wants 
labour market activation (active labour market policy) as a condition for 
receipt of social grants by the unemployed. Wage subsidies may have 
some impact, but as the modesty of their architect shows (although he 
does not say as much), they may alleviate, but they will not solve the 
problem of mass unemployment. 
 
SOME BIG ARITHMETIC 
 
Unlike government’s existing and proposed measures to ‘rescue’ the able-
bodied poor, a Basic Income Grant could reach them quickly and 
efficiently (if the mess that is the Department of Home Affairs could be 
sorted out). Several simulations showing that a grant of R100 per month 
(in 2000 prices) was fiscally feasible, were prepared for the Taylor 
Committee (le Roux, 2002; Meth, 2002; Samson et al, 2002). In doing so, 
a distinction was made between gross costs of the grant (the sum that had 
to be raised to give the grant to everyone), and net costs (the cost after 
claw-back through the tax system). Opponents of the BIG invariably cite 
gross costs of the grant as a major reason for not making the grant (the 
other major reason is the ‘dependency’ it would allegedly cause). Yet as 
Pieter le Roux pointed out a long time ago, the net cost (roughly, the 
amount remaining in the hands of the poor after tax claw-back) is 
considerably less than the gross cost (le Roux, 2002, pp.105ff). 
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One way to approach the question of the affordability of the grant is by 
examining increases in final consumption expenditure by households. 
Ideally, what is required for such an exercise is a set of yearly estimates 
of the distribution of expenditure by household decile. Since these are not 
available, it is necessary to make do with what is – namely, the annual 
estimates of consumption expenditure presented in the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) Quarterly Bulletins (the March 2008 edition has 
been used) and the observations for one year in the Income and 
Expenditure Survey (IES) for 2005/2006. xxxix 
 
The value of the BIG proposed by the Taylor Committee was R100 per 
month in 2000 (in current prices).xl To keep pace with inflation, this 
would have had to have grown to about R144 by 2007 (in current prices). 
Excluding delivery costs,xli the gross cost of the grant would have been 
about R56.6 billion in 2001. By 2007, in current prices, the total cost, 
adjusted for population growth as well, would have been approximately 
R82 billion. 
 
Final consumption expenditure by households (measured in current 
prices) increased by R59 billion between 2000 and 2001, and by R145.3 
billion between 2006 and 2007 (SARB Quarterly Bulletin, March 2008, 
p.S-107). Year-on-year growth in household consumption thus exceeded 
the gross cost of a BIG (of R100 per capita per month in 2000 prices) in 
2001 – by 2007, growth in consumption was almost 80 per cent as large 
again as the gross cost of a BIG. In 2001, the gross cost of a BIG would 
have amounted to 8.9 per cent of final consumption – by 2007 it would 
have fallen to 6.7 per cent of final consumption expenditure (clearly, it is 
assumed here that the introduction of a BIG would not have had adverse 
economic effects). 
 
If 2005/2006 IES is to be trusted, about two-thirds (65 per cent) of the 
annual increase in final expenditure would have been consumed by fewer 
than nine million people among a population of about 47 million (that is, 
the roughly 18 per cent of the total population in household deciles 9 and 
10). Supposing that the grant had been introduced in 2007, a sacrifice by 
the well-off of part of their increase in consumption in that year (and its 
equivalent in succeeding years), would have financed the BIG with ease. 
The net cost of a BIG of R100 in 2000 prices (the cost after tax claw-
back) would probably have been somewhere in the region of 35-40 per 
cent of the gross cost of the grant (Meth, 2002, pp.41-42). On the 
assumption that the net cost of a BIG would be about 37 per cent of the 
gross, it looks as though net cost expressed as a proportion of the increase 
32 BASIC INCOME GRANT: THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE! 
in final consumption between 2000 and 2001, would probably have been 
in the region of 35 per cent. By 2007, this would have fallen to about 21 
per cent. If most of the tax claw-back was from the folk in deciles 9 and 
10 (the top decile), then they would have given up about half of the 
increase in consumption they enjoyed. By 2007, the proportional sacrifice 
they would have been required to make would have fallen below one-
third of the increase in their consumption.xlii Thus, after the initial shock, 
and assuming that the economy grows at a reasonable pace (four per cent 
on average should not be beyond reach), in subsequent years, the 
proportion of the increase in consumption of the well-off would have to 
sacrifice would fall with each succeeding year. 
 
Another way of looking at the question is to note that in constant price 
terms (2000 prices), the value of final consumption expenditure by 
households increased by R20 billion between 2000 and 2001. This was 
roughly the estimated net cost of the BIG in the year 2000. Between 2006 
and 2007, the increase had grown in size to R55 billion – the increase in 
the latter year was thus almost three times as large as it was in the first 
year. South Africa’s population in 2007 was about 47.9 million, and in 
2000, about 44.1 million, an increase of 8.5 per cent. Because final 
consumption expenditure growth rapidly outstrips population growth, 
mean per capita expenditure rose from roughly R13 173 per annum in 
2000, to about R17 703 in 2007, an increase of R4530 (all in constant 
2000 rands). 
 
At the top end of the income distribution, the increase, in absolute terms, 
would have been much larger, while at the bottom end it would have been 
smaller. Shuffling income around so that the poor received an extra 
R1200 per annum of the total increase would not have placed an 
intolerable burden on the well-to-do. Keeping the real value of the BIG 
constant, it is likely that the net burden would have increased by roughly 
the same proportion as the population over the period Clearly, if R100 per 
person per month was feasible in 2000, then its equivalent (or more) in 
real terms today must also be feasible, even allowing for population 
growth. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Among the less impolite epithets flung at proponents of the Basic Income 
Grant (BIG) is that of ‘populist’. Dire predictions about what would 
happen if ‘Latin American-type’ redistributive policies were tried here are 
routinely offered, as though none of us had read any of, for example, 
Chile’s history. We are informed, for good measure, as though we were 
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unfamiliar with the concept of opportunity cost, that diverting 
government revenue from other vital areas means pandering to 
consumption, at the expense of investment (health and education being 
most frequently mentioned). What few of these critics do is to stand back 
from their ideology (of which, like halitosis, they seem blissfully 
unaware), and pose a series of hard questions, something along the 
following lines (the list is not exhaustive): 
 
• Will what is being done or proposed now, work? (i.e., can poverty, 
unemployment and inequality be tamed in an acceptable period of 
time?) 
• If there is a likelihood that it will not, is there something else that 
could be done instead? Could that something else be more robust 
redistribution? 
• Do our policies pass the Display Test? 
• Do our policies benefit the most needy, i.e., are they in accordance 
with Standing’s Security Difference Principle? 
• Would easing up on the sillier aspects of BEE, the target of (polite) 
Harvard criticism, make well-off (whites) more receptive to the 
idea of greater redistribution through the fiscus? 
• Does the ANC ideology of ‘dependency’ have any real basis, or is 
it simply a self-serving elite fantasy? 
 
This paper has played around with a few of these questions, in particular, 
the first three of them. Emerging from the speculations about poverty 
reduction illustrated in Table 1, were some fairly shocking figures about 
inequality – according to the 2005/2006 Income and Expenditure Survey 
from which the base year figures in that table are drawn, mean annual 
household expenditure in the bottom decile was R5775, while that in the 
top decile was R320 295 (medians were R5995 and R250 750 
respectively). Those in the top decile received more than 50 per cent of 
total income – those in the bottom decile 0.2 per cent. In decile 2, it was 
1.2 per cent and in decile 3, 2.2 per cent (Report No. 01-00-01 (2008), 
pp.31-33). The 11-12 million people in these households make up about 
one-quarter of the population. Even if the difficulties of under-reporting 
are severe (and for the 2005/2006 IES they appear not be), these figures, 
treated simply as orders of magnitude, illustrate, in practical terms, what 
lurks behind the high Gini coefficients one hears being bandied about. 
 
That a modest Basic Income Grant is affordable admits of no doubt – 
unless, that is, the well-off reduce their labour input, and potential 
investors take fright. To finance the grant, redistribution is necessary – 
hardly, one would have thought, a contentious proposal to make in one of 
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the most unequal countries in the world. Creating a climate in which the 
well-off could be persuaded to make the necessary sacrifice is a political 
project of the utmost importance – understanding the conditions 
necessary for its achievement requires a concentrated research effort. The 
feasible size of a BIG, and the means by which it should be distributed, as 
well as the ways in which it should be financed, are also questions that 
need to be addressed as a matter of extreme urgency. 
 
An affordable BIG (could this be in the region of R150-200?) cannot 
make the poor rich. It will not even lift all households above whatever 
miserable poverty line is adopted by the Treasury. It would, however, 
keep the wolf from the door. For many poor households, it could provide 
a base from which the efforts at self-help, so desired by our political 
rulers, could commence and be sustained. 
 
Objections to the BIG are primarily political (or ideological) – they have 
little basis in substantive research. One (relatively crude) critique 
(Thurlow, 2002),xliii enjoyed popularity in official circles, presumably 
because it showed the possible negative macroeconomic effects of a BIG 
The fact that the paper could be billed as ‘international research’ probably 
encouraged the belief that it was ‘authoritative’, as did, no doubt, the fact 
that its results were churned out by a CGE model. As the department with 
the greatest research capacity and the greatest interest in the BIG (if only 
to demonstrate conclusively that such a thing was unaffordable), one 
might reasonably have expected Treasury to have devoted time and 
energy to both the micro- and macro-economic aspects of the issue. 
Thurlow suggested ‘more research’, and so did the rest of us. It does not 
seem, however, as though much more has been done since the flurry of 
papers that appeared in 2002 – certainly, if Treasury has carried out or 
commissioned additional work since then on this critical question, the 
results of such activities have not been made public.xliv 
 
It has been left to the initiative of outsiders to build the models necessary 
to begin addressing this issue. If the oft-expressed commitment to 
evidence-based policy formation were sincere, government would long 
since have launched a major project aimed at exploring the merits (and 
demerits) of a BIG in a dispassionate manner. Instead, precious years 
have been frittered away while government sought to ‘prove’ that the 
conditions of the poor were improving at a rate of which the poor 
approved. 
 
Given my treatment of the arguments against the BIG, it would be 
hypocritical if I did not insist that the proposal for the introduction of 
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such a grant be subjected to the Display Test as well. Every objection, 
trivial or substantial, should be evaluated. Of course, many of the 
predictions made about the effects of the BIG, positive and negative, can 
only be tested in practice. This makes it all the more important to exercise 
both caution and critical faculty beforehand. Like policies aimed at curing 
poverty by means of ‘accelerated and shared growth’, the proposal to 
make modest social grants universal, is a major piece of social 
engineering (but so too, is doing nothing). The law of unintended 
consequences will work, to a greater or lesser extent, on all policy options 
– our task as analysts (and one in which we can never be wholly 
successful) is to try to anticipate what these might be. 
 
My perception is that although considerable progress has been made (the 
child support grant story, for all its warts, is a mammoth success), the 
illusion that the poor would continue to look favourably upon the appeals 
for patience while government seeks to undo the evils of centuries of 
colonial domination and segregation, followed by five decades of 
apartheid, has been shattered by recent events. How long will it be before 
violent, ill-disciplined people, people with no hope, no voice and no 
scruples, begin to view South Africans who live in luxury (or even 
comparative luxury), as interlopers? 
 
It is also my view that a country like South Africa, with its mass poverty 
and mass unemployment, cannot solve the age-old problem of what to do 
about the able-bodied poor, using the means employed in wealthy 
economies, especially the social democracies. The country does not have 
the resources to engage in the sort of one-on-one activities necessary to 
make active labour market policies work (assuming that the jobs into 
which to insert people exist). Policies aimed at improving education, 
skills training, and labour market information will succeed in propelling 
some people into employment. So too, will the proposed wage subsidy. 
They will not, however, do much more than scratch the surface of the 
problem – the roughly six million people in workerless households who 
do not qualify for grants, along with the couple of million in households 
containing the working poor, cannot be reached by any of the 
conventional social protection mechanisms. Unless a way can be found to 
provide them with social grants, they will continue to depend, as they 
presently do in large numbers, on grants that are not intended for them – 
child support grants, pensions and disability grants. Introducing a grant 
for all adults (except pensioners and the disabled) would make it possible 
to allow the real value of the child support grant to fall because the adults 
who once consumed a large part of it will no longer be doing so. Once the 
adult grant had caught up with the child support grant, both could be 
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inflation adjusted. Providing a universal grant would remove the pressure 
from the state old-age pension – if the number of people depending on the 
pension were to be reduced, most of the elderly would be lifted well 
above the poverty line. 
 
Unless growth fundamentalists can muster much more compelling 
arguments, my conclusion is that in South Africa at least, dismissing out 
of hand (or ignoring), the case for more redistribution, is wrong. Growth 
alone cannot do the job – everybody recognises that growth is necessary 
(certainly, no proponent of the BIG whom I have ever met, denies the 
importance of growth), but most acknowledge as well (or insist) that it is 
not sufficient. If poor people were to have placed before them, the pros 
and cons of the various options, it seems unlikely that they would be 
swayed by a claim that growth can do enough in the short- to medium-
term to make it reasonable to deny them the relief from poverty in the 
form of social grants, which the well-to-do in this country could so easily 
afford to finance. 
 
An affordable basic income grant cannot make the poor rich – it probably 
would not even lift all households above whatever miserable poverty line 
is finally adopted by Treasury. It would, however, keep the wolf from the 
door – for many poor households, it could provide a base from which 
efforts at self-help, so desired by our political rulers, could commence 
and be sustained. Growth has not been able to eliminate poverty in 
wealthy countries like the UK and USA – there is little chance that it will 
do so in South Africa. This means that it is impossible to look forward to 
a time when a BIG will not be necessary. What is required is the political 
will to entertain the possibility of what seems to me to be glaringly 
obvious, namely that growth alone cannot do what is demanded of it. If 
that were done, the task of explaining to the well-to-do (probably, as 
noted above, more receptive now to such thoughts, than at any time in the 
recent past), the necessity for tackling poverty and inequality, quickly and 
directly, could begin to be tackled. 
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
i Suppose the worst-off group is smallish, hard to identify and 
administratively difficult to reach. There is some merit in the argument 
that social justice would be served by helping those ‘next’ to the bottom, 
while attempts were being made to increase the accessibility of the worst-
off group. 
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ii The passage quoted here was used in an article that considered rational 
ignorance and poverty statistics (Meth, 2007b). Rational ignorance is a 
concept which posits that when the cost of obtaining the information 
required to make an informed decision exceeds the expected benefits of 
making that decision, it is economically irrational to spend time and 
resources acquiring the information in question. 
 
iii We know that in South Africa, many go hungry. We also know that the 
Constitution grants everyone the right not to go hungry. Clearly, the 
existence of the right is not sufficient to prevent hunger. The likely reason 
for the gap between the promise and the reality is the inability of poor 
and/or oppressed to make demands effectively. To put it bluntly, they 
lack the political power to enforce their demands. 
 
iv Grootboom is much-discussed, and with good reason. Among the many 
who have written about it, here is Rogers Dhliwayo of Idasa: “In 
Grootboom and Others, a group of adults and children had been rendered 
homeless as result of their eviction from an informal dwelling situated on 
private land earmarked for formal low-cost housing. The respondents 
applied for an order requiring local government to provide them with 
adequate shelter or housing until they obtained permanent 
accommodation. The Constitutional Court held that the state has an 
obligation to provide for the housing needs of those unable to support 
themselves and their dependents.” The Court stopped short of saying how 
this obligation should be discharged. In a footnote, the author points out 
that details of the Grootboom case (2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 2001 (1) 
46 (CC))) are available at http://www.concourt.gov.za 
 
v In 2005, the pension was set at R780 per month. In 2006 it was R820. 
Median per capita income, estimated from the 2005/2006 Income and 
Expenditure Survey (IES), was R577. Median incomes in the IES would 
have had to have been under-reported by about 40 per cent to bring them 
into equality with pensions. If one accepts the Hoogeveen and Özler 
(2004, p.9) upper-bound poverty line of R593 per capita per month in 
2000 prices, i.e., about R795 per month in 2006 prices, then pensioners 
with no other sources of income hover quite close to poverty. 
 
vi Apologies for the orgy of self-citation are sought in advance. The 
papers cited consider the contributions made by others to the debate on 
poverty and unemployment, topics on which I have been working, more 
or less without cease, since being appointed to the Taylor Committee in 
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July 2000. Running through all my work is a theme which says that over-
estimation of success in the struggle against poverty and inequality is a 
serious, possibly fatal error. From the point of view of intellectual rigour, 
probably the most outstanding work on poverty is the collection of papers 
by Bhorat et al (2001). In propaganda terms, the most significant work is 
that of van der Berg and his colleagues. Although it offers a significant 
critique of much of the published work on poverty, as well as an 
innovative attempt to use alternative data sources to measure poverty, 
what should be tentative findings have been taken up by a government all 
too keen to demonstrate that its policies are working. 
 
vii It is not possible to review here, all of these interventions, even less so 
is it possible to consider the many other policy tools deployed to foster 
growth. That is not the object of the exercise. The task, rather, is to pose 
the question: ‘can all of these activities reduce poverty and 
unemployment at an acceptable rate?’ The answer to that question seems 
to be in the negative. 
 
viii Two initiatives, funded by Britain’s Department for International 
Development (DfID), are currently investigating the possibility of 
introducing job guarantee schemes for the unemployed. 
 
ix Of late, even the World Bank has come to recognise that social grants 
may be superior to public works programmes. A paper by Murgai and 
Ravallion (2005) looking at the proposed extension of the Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS), to the country as a whole 
(EGS), in terms of which the government would act as employer of last 
resort to the entire surplus rural labour force, concluded that an un-
targeted grant (of equal fiscal size) to all rural folk (how non-rural 
claimants would be excluded is not obvious from their discussion) would 
have a greater poverty-reducing impact than the EGS (2005, p.23). Their 
findings are hedged about with caveats, but the fact that the Bank is even 
prepared to sanction such research, is an indication of the severe strain 
which massive public works programmes impose. 
 
x The hope that some significant number of EPWP participants will be 
able to ‘graduate’ out of poverty after the short spell of employment the 
programme is supposed to offer, is pure delusion – for people in the many 
areas of the country where there is little hope of stimulating economic 
activity, EPWP employment, if it were not deliberately (and callously) 
curtailed, would create a dependency even stronger than that likely to 
result from the social grants the ANC fears so much. 
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xi These ratios are estimated from the data set for the 2006 General 
Household Survey (GHS). 
 
xii It can be turned into one by extending the boundary of youth up to the 
age of 35 years. Whatever reasons justified such a deviation from 
international norms (see below) in this regard in the past, it is not obvious 
why such a distinction should continue to be maintained. The tension 
between defining youth as someone aged between 15 and 34 years, and 
the recent reduction in the Children’s Act of the age of majority from 21 
to 18 years is obvious. Using the UK as an example of international 
norms, we note that when youth unemployment is being discussed, it is 
held to affect individuals aged between 16 and 24 years. The New Deal 
for Young People, the active labour market policy in the UK for dealing 
with unemployed youth, is for those under the age of 25 years. 
 
xiii Labels of this sort have been attached to the unemployed for quite a 
while. In 2002, former Director-General of the Department of Trade and 
Industry, Alistair Ruiters, was reported as saying that “most of the 
unemployed were unemployable because they lacked the skills required 
by the economy as it restructured and became more capital intensive.” 
The claim appeared in a newspaper article by Linda Ensor under the 
heading “Most jobless people ‘are unemployable’ ” (Business Day, 8 
May 2002). 
The year before that, Bhorat flirted with the concept of unemployability – 
in a paper looking at public expenditure and poverty alleviation, he stated 
that: “Studies of labour demand patterns in the economy … have argued 
that in many cases individuals at the low end of the labour market are not 
going to be in great demand, and indeed large sections of the unemployed 
are unlikely to be employed anyway.” (2001, p.168) In support of this 
claim he cited a piece of collaborative work (Bhorat and Hodge, 1999). 
The latter paper, which examines structural change and changes in 
production methods, draws highly pessimistic conclusions for African, 
and to a somewhat lesser extent Coloured, labour market participants. 
 
xiv See for example, the article by David Christianson, “Government cool 
on Harvard reforms”, Business Day online version, 19 May 2008. An 
earlier article by Nic Dawes in the Mail & Guardian (online edition), 
under the headline “Liberalise to grow: heads butt over Asgisa” (27 
October 2006), pointed to the shape that responses to the final report were 
likely to take. 
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xv Other commentators talk of ‘dependency’ in the same tone as the ANC. 
Discussing possible responses to the impact of rising food prices on the 
wellbeing of those in poverty, Azar Jammine, head of a well-known 
research consultancy, said that “Increases in social grants, the issuance of 
food vouchers or the direct delivery of food parcels to the poor carry the 
risk of increasing the dependency syndrome among the poor.” See the 
article “Econometrix backs VAT cut on foods”, Business News, 
Wednesday 14 2008, p.5. Syndrome is an interesting word – according to 
the Oxford English Dictionary, it has two meanings, the first is ‘a group 
of symptoms which consistently occur together’, the second ‘a 
characteristic combination of opinions, emotions, or behaviour’. Not 
surprisingly, Jammine does not say whether he regards ‘dependency’ as 
an illness (the first meaning), or simply a form of behaviour in which 
‘they’ (the poor), routinely engage (he may regard it as both). 
 
xvi Hausmann nibbles at the (weak) claim that income inequality is 
substantially reduced (2008, p.1n) by what is referred to by government 
as the ‘social wage’. In its most extreme (preposterous) form, the 
government’s Ten Year Review had the social wage reducing income 
inequality to such an extent that the Gini coefficient of 0.68 in 1997 (pre-
taxes and transfers), fell to 0.35 in 2000, after taxes and transfers (PCAS, 
2003, pp.90ff). If the very high Gini coefficients yielded by the 
2005/2006 IES (Statistics South Africa, 2008, pp.36ff) are to be believed, 
then it is possible that the emergence of a small but significant Black 
middle class, on the one hand, and the continuing presence of households 
containing no workers, and receiving no grants, on the other, has 
contributed to an increase in income inequality in South Africa, rising 
social spending notwithstanding. 
 
xvii Treasury’s prediction for growth in the medium-term is 4.3 per cent 
per annum. See Budget Review 2008, p.2. 
 
xviii The Harvard University group appointed by government, draws 
heavily on academics of the Kennedy School who run the Master of 
Public Administration / International Development (MPAID) program. 
Dani Rodrik (on whom, more below) notes that at the time of its creation 
ten years ago, the MPAID was to be ‘a program with no equal anywhere’. 
Although the appointment of this particular group raised a few quizzical 
eyebrows (mine included), I did not give much thought to the question of 
the group’s ideology (which I expected to incline toward the 
conservative), until idle Googling threw up some interesting links to 
Ricardo Hausmann. One of these was to ‘BoRev.net, Dispatches from the 
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Bolivarian Revolution’. Highly polemical, the posting on that site on 
October 22, 2007 (Everyone’s smarter than Ricardo Hausmann), 
discusses his alleged role in the shock-treatment applied to Venezuela’s 
ailing economy by the Pérez government in 1989. One would hope, if the 
allegations have any substance, that these were sins of Hausmann’s 
youth, and that he now subscribes fully to MPAID’s ethos of “hard minds 
and soft hearts” (see Dani Rodrik’s weblog, “Thoughts on graduation and 
the MPAID program”, June 04, 2008). Without knowing a great deal 
more about Latin American politics, it is difficult to take a view one way 
or another on the issue. Perhaps the place to start is with the (apparently) 
more measured presentation in Coppedge (2000). Hausmann’s biography 
on the Harvard site says that he was Professor of Economics in IESA 
between 1985-1991, where he founded the Center for Public Policy 
(IESA stands for Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración). 
The Coppedge paper’s reference to the name given to the group of which 
Hausmann was a member – the ‘IESA boys’, by analogy with the 
‘Chicago boys’, is not very flattering. There are chilling parallels between 
the ‘paquete’ of measures introduced by the Pérez government in 1989 
and South Africa’s GEAR – in Venezuela, however, popular reaction was 
violent, leading to the disturbances referred to as the Caracazo. 
According to Jana Silverman, this urban uprising “… began as a series of 
uncoordinated, unplanned protests in the working class suburbs of 
Caracas against the doubling in price of bus fares – a direct consequence 
of the neoliberal economic package recently implemented by President 
Carlos Andrés Pérez.” See “The Contradictions of Hugo Chavez”, 
Published on July 14, 2002, in ‘Left turn: Notes from the global intifada’, 
Downloaded 5th June 2008. 
 
xix A group of Chicago University-trained Chilean economists, who 
served the government of that country’s military dictator, Augusto 
Pinochet (1974-1988). 
 
xx In the form handed down to us, this is still inadequate, because there 
are few ‘inert nostrums’ in social and economic policy. Even a decision to 
do nothing to change existing policies, could have harmful, if unintended 
consequences. 
 
xxi Policies guaranteed to bring about Pareto optima (positive-sum 
games?) would meet the ‘do no harm’ criterion. If the marginal utility of 
income were constant, and if a given transfer of income could be effected 
without frictional losses, the result would be a zero-sum. If the marginal 
utility of income declines sufficiently to offset the frictional and 
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efficiency losses that are likely to result from a redistributive transfer in 
the real world, then society’s overall utility would rise (a positive sum). 
 
xxii A book with this maxim as title appeared in 1999 (Anderson, 1999). 
Much of the special issue of the journal Disasters (December 1998), was 
devoted to the search for principles in the wake of the crisis of 
humanitarian action marked by such failures as Rwanda, Bosnia, Sudan 
and Zaire (Hendrickson, 1998, p.283). Leader argues that the core 
principles (impartiality, neutrality and independence), have been 
remarkably constant – what was lacking was knowledge of how to apply 
them (1998, p.305). 
 
xxiii As Debbie Budlender points out, an injunction of this sort sounds like 
the rather lame ‘more research is needed (pers. comm. 13th June). That is 
not what intended – scattered throughout the Harvard papers are some 
quite pessimistic findings. One example (the remarks about potential 
growth referred to above are another), may be found in the Frankel et al 
(2006) paper. On p.9 they observe that: “If, as we will show, the current 
ASGI-SA framework poses a major challenge in terms of external 
sustainability, what are the policy options to make the program feasible? 
And then there is still the question of whether there will be productive 
opportunities for such a large increase in public infrastructure. Or will the 
economy just pile up a large number of “white elephant” projects?” For 
further discussion of this issue in their paper, see pp.56ff. Gathering such 
comments and knitting them into a sober assessment of the AsgiSA’s 
prospects, would inject a much-needed note of realism into the 
conversation. 
 
xxiv The ethical implications of the adoption of arbitrary boundaries like 
this merit consideration. Why not 35 years for the men? Or 40 years? It 
may well be appropriate to discriminate in favour of women, but doing 
so, would require a strong motivation. 
 
xxv See, for example, the reference to a World Bank study which reports 
this finding, in footnote 12 in Levinsohn, 2008, p.11. 
 
xxvi Banerjee et al (2006, p.4) argue that: “The unemployed are becoming, 
on average, less skilled and the gap is widening between their skill level 
and the skill level of the employed. These results have important policy 
implications. For example, because the unemployed became ever less-
skilled, and those employed yet more skilled, policies to transition the 
unemployed into the labor market face even greater hurdles.” This claim 
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appears not to sit too comfortably with evidence of rising educational 
levels among the unemployed. In that regard, however, there are two 
comments to be made. In the first place, education does not equal skill, 
and in the second, South Africa’s schools are reportedly doing a 
singularly poor job of preparing youngsters for the world of work. 
Arguing that socio-economic status (SES) is a major determinant of 
school performance in South Africa (i.e., inequality matters), van der 
Berg (2005, p.67) concludes that (partly) because of inequalities: “… the 
great majority of our schools are dysfunctional”. “Even middle-income 
South Africans,” he argues, “with all the advantages that means, get 
dragged down by their schools, rather than being provided with 
opportunities by them. Truly transformational education should mean that 
schools are able to turn around the effects of the lower SES and 
counteract some of the effects of poverty on education. We are far from 
this state.” 
 
xxvii The original work on wage subsidies in the ‘new’ South Africa was 
done by Heintz and Bowles (1996). In the ‘old’ South Africa, wage 
subsidies to foster the aims of the Regional Industrial Development 
Policy (RIDP) gained a very bad name because of the rampant corruption 
and abuse their poor design encouraged. 
 
xxviii As befits work carried out by such a high-powered group, the Report 
has generated much interest in the responsible parts of the business press. 
The Financial Times (London) ran a thoroughly dismissive piece by Bill 
Easterly – see “Trust the development experts – all 7bn” (online edition, 
May 28 2008). This elicited a “put-down” (Dani Rodrik’s phrase – see his 
weblog ‘Unconventional thoughts on economic development and 
globalization’, June 03, 2008) from Martin Wolf “Useful dos and don’ts 
for fast economic growth” (Financial Times online edition, June 3 2008). 
According to Rodrik, the best response to Easterly was by Jonathan 
Dingel, who said (on his weblog ‘Trade Diversion’) that: “If you’re 
overconfident about development, Bill Easterly pokes holes in your 
arguments. And if you’re modest, he makes fun of you.” (May 28, 2008). 
 
xxix A PowerPoint presentation by one of the ‘renowned’ economists 
(Nobel laureate Michael Spence) was used in the launch of The Growth 
Report. The version I downloaded on 22nd May 2008 has Spence, 
presumably anxious to drive home the point about growth and 
redistribution, telling us (on slide 19) that: 
• “Growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduction in poor 
countries 
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• It is arithmetically impossible to reduce poverty through redistribution 
in countries where the average income is below 700 dollars a day.” 
[Did Spence mean to say ‘per annum’?] 
•  
xxx The Minister does not specify the form that growth may take. Instead, 
he cites a passage from The Growth Report, (it is on p.3 of the Report) 
part of which reads as follows: 
“[Policy makers] will succeed only if their promises are credible and 
inclusive, reassuring people that they or their children will enjoy their full 
share of the fruits of growth.” 
In development jargon, ‘inclusive’ appears to have succeeded the ‘shared 
growth’ (as in AsgiSA) which, in turn, seems to have supplanted ‘pro-
poor growth’. 
 
xxxi It makes sense to treat the EPWP not as a grant (as some 
commentators do), but rather as quasi-government employment to 
counter labour market failure. 
 
xxxii Although Treasury appears to look favourably upon subsidies, it has 
not yet decided on the form that these should take. Budget Review 2008 
(p.104) refers to extensive modeling of a broad-based subsidy costing 
about R25 billion (per annum?) that would increase employment by about 
325 000 over a five-year period. The combined effect of the subsidy and 
social insurance would, it is claimed, reduce the poverty headcount by 20 
per cent. Reference is also made in the Review to the subsidy for first-
time workseekers (the Levinsohn proposal, or some variant of it). 
 
xxxiii The addition of just two words ‘if possible’, would transform draft 
resolution 44. 
 
xxxiv In case anyone misses the point, the Oxford English Dictionary 
defines diktat as an order or decree imposed by someone in power 
without popular consent. As far as social protection is concerned, it is 
unlikely that the proceedings at Polokwane represent the ‘people’s will’. 
A referendum, preceded by widespread debate would be a far more 
reliable test of that slippery concept. 
 
xxxv This is the progressive interpretation of their predicament; the 
conservative view is that they are idle, refusing to accept work at the 
‘going wage’. 
 
50 BASIC INCOME GRANT: THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE! 
                                                                                                                                            
xxxvi To estimate per capita incomes, use has to be made of the 
unsatisfactory assumption that incomes are equally distributed within 
households (there is no practical alternative). For an exercise of the sort 
proposed here, this is unfortunate, but not fatal. 
 
xxxvii Differences between mean and median estimates of income in the 
lower deciles are small. See Statistics South Africa, Report 01-00-01 
(2008), p.32. 
 
xxxviii Given the progressive nature of the tax system, these ratios overstate 
inequalities. Because the well-to-do are skilled at reducing their tax 
burden, it is not easy to ascertain the extent of overstatement. 
 
xxxix Final consumption figures in the estimates below are from the SARB 
Quarterly Bulletin for March 2008 (p.S-107). 
 
xl Like other social grants in South Africa, the amount was fixed 
arbitrarily. The Consumer Price Indices used to inflate the BIG are from 
the SARB’s website (Series KBP7032J). Population estimates have been 
made by backcasting the 2007 mid-year population figure using the 
growth rates given in Statistical Release P0302, 3 July 2007, p.3. These 
go back as far as the year 2001-2002. A growth rate of 1.28 per cent per 
annum for the year 2000-2001 is assumed, to allow a population figure 
for 2000 to be estimated. 
 
xli Happily ignoring the potential of advanced technology, figures of 20 
per cent or more of the cost of the grant were bandied about by opponents 
of the grant. 
 
xlii The calculations on which these estimates are based will be made 
available on application to the author – chasmeth@googlemail.com. My 
proposal (Meth, 2002) following that by le Roux (2002), called for the tax 
burden to be spread (by VAT) much further down the income 
distribution. Although the amounts collected would be relatively small, 
those in households with modest incomes (say, down to about R2500 per 
month) are so much better-off than the poor, that calling for a 
contribution from them (in the spirit of solidarity) would not be 
inappropriate. Tax burdens on those in deciles 9 and 10 would be 
minimised if satisfactory tax mechanisms could be devised for clawing 
back the grant from those who do not ‘need’ it. 
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xliii Thurlow acknowledges (grudgingly?) that a BIG “… appears to 
overcome the problem of identifying the poor… ” (2002, p.22) and 
acknowledges on the same page that “… the results [spewed out by his 
model] do suggest that the income distributional effects of the [BIG] are 
progressive”. His concern with the sustainability (fiscal and political) of 
the grant, leads him to an unrequited flirtation with targeted grants – the 
statement cited above on the ‘progressive’ nature of the BIG is preceded 
by a warning to the effect that “… this study is unable to determine the 
microeconomic advantages of targeted as opposed to universal grants… 
”. Given the predominantly macroeconomic emphasis of his paper, 
detailed microeconomic analysis of grants with conditions attached to 
them is hardly to be expected. What is odd, however, is that Thurlow 
should have floated the ‘targeted grants’ red herring at all. He notes quite 
explicitly early on in his paper (p.3) that BIG works by ‘avoiding the 
means test’ – an inescapable feature of any targeted grant aimed at the 
able-bodied poor, who, as we note above, lack characteristics such as age 
that would make them easy to identify. 
 
xliv This includes the results of some modelling commissioned from 
Professor Simkins in the University of the Witwatersrand. 
